B. Legislative and Judicial Provisions
In addition to statutory direct infringement, the Courts have judicially expanded copyright protection over the years through contributory and vicarious liability, also known as secondary liability. Contributory infringement occurs when one intentionally induces or encourages direct infringement, either by personal conduct that furthers the infringement or providing the means to infringe. 7 Vicarious liability occurs when one profits from direct infringement while declining to stop or limit the infringement. 8 Notably, neither intent nor knowledge of infringement is required with vicarious copyright liability.
This expansion was greatly affected by the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., where the Supreme Court adopted the "staple article of commerce" doctrine from patent law in determining whether Sony's sale of the Betamax recorder constituted contributory copyright infringement. 9 The court found that Sony was not liable for contributory infringement since its Betamax was capable of substantial non-infringing uses. 10 This ruling created a well-known "safe harbor" defense for companies upon a showing that a new technology has legitimate purposes, even though it can also be used to commit copyright infringement.
Then along came Napster. This peer-to-peer file sharing system provided software to users that allowed them to download and exchange MP3 music files. Napster maintained a central server which indexed all of the files available from other users. Users could also search the indexes for music they wished to download. When major music companies filed suit against Napster, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals seemed to have little difficulty deciding that Napster had committed contributory copyright infringement. 11 The Court relied primarily on Napster's knowledge of the infringement based on internal emails and notices provided by the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA). 12 The Court further found that the centralized servers provided the means to infringe on the Plaintiff's copyrights, thus nailing the coffin shut on Napster.
The next wave of peer-to-peer systems utilized decentralized serversthese were true peer-to-peer systems -which theoretically would escape the "means to infringe" problems created by Napster. These systems allowed users to download the software necessary to connect to other peers; however, the software distributor (Grokster, StreamCast, eDonkey) did not maintain any information on a central server. Ultimately, the major record labels, organized by the RIAA, would pursue these companies as well.
In 2001, the U.S. Supreme Court decided the case of Metro-GoldwynMayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., not based on vicarious or contributory infringement, but by adding an additional theory of liability from common law -the inducement rule. The Court held that one is liable for secondary infringement, under the inducement theory, for distributing a device "with the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps." 13 The facts in this case showed that Grokster and StreamCast distributed free software to users after the courts effectively shut down Napster. Evidence was introduced at trial that both companies encouraged users to download copyrighted works and that they were aware a majority of their users were using the software for copyright infringement.
14 Even though the software was free, both Grokster and StreamCast sold space to advertisers. These ads were streamed to users while the software was employed, while revenue increased with each additional user. 15 Furthermore, StreamCast and Grokster made no effort to filter or impede the downloading of copyrighted material, and there was evidence of infringement "on a gigantic scale."
16 All of these factors provided the Court with ample evidence that StreamCast and Grokster intended to profit from third-party acts of infringement in violation of the Copyright Act. The Supreme Court determined that the Ninth Circuit had misapplied the Sony case in its opinion below, but declined to address the holding in Sony, and its safe-harbor provision, any further.
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This decidedly leaves open the question of how Sony's safe-harbor provision would apply in a case involving current peer-to-peer software like BitTorrent or others.
C. Litigation
The Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) and RIAA have been busy the past few years filing suits against individual copyright infringers; there is, after all, no safe harbor defense for direct infringement. 13 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc., v. Grokster, 545 U.S. 913, 919 (2005). 14 Id. at 923-24. 15 Id. at 926. 16 Id. at 939-40. 17 Leaving "further consideration of the Sony rule for a day when that may be required." Id. at 934.
In fact, NPR reports that record companies have filed over 26,000 lawsuits for illegal file sharing since 2003. 18 In the Jammie Thomas case, the first illegal downloading case to get to a jury verdict, the court ordered Thomas, a single mother, to pay $222,000 in criminal sanctions for dozens of songs downloaded using Kazaa. 19 She was granted a new trial, however, and on retrial in June of 2009, the jury found her liable for willfully infringing all 24 copyrights at issue in the case, awarding the record labels $1.92 million in damages. 20 On a motion for new trial and remittitur, the judge reduced the damage award to $54,000, or three times the statutory minimum per sound recording infringed. 21 Still other cases involved university students' use of file-sharing programs to download illegal music and movie files. The RIAA was particularly successful in litigating these cases, extracting settlements in most of them ranging from a few thousand to hundreds of thousands of dollars. 22 However, the music industry announced in 2008 that it would abandon the practice of filing suit against large number of individual users, opting instead to work with Internet Service Providers (ISPs) to control illegal downloading. 23 Many say the strategy did not stop illegal downloading and tarnished an already negative image for the music labels. 24 In addition to the Jammie Thomas case, there have been criminal cases in the United States resulting in jail time for copyright infringement. For example, Grant T. Stanley of Wise, Virginia "was sentenced to five months in prison to be followed by five months of home detention for his role in a BitTorrent peer-to-peer network." 25 Even though the use of peer-to-peer file sharing networks to download copyrighted material is risky business for individual users, the RIAA and MPAA's prospect of litigating these cases appears to be doing little to stem the tide of illegal downloads worldwide. This is evidenced by the RIAA and MPAA's recent push to stop illegal downloading from torrent trackers through international political channels. The topic was also discussed at the G8 meeting in Japan in July, 2008. The G8 Summit website release stated that the member nations will accelerate the establishment of a "new international legal framework, the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), and seek to complete the negotiation by the end of this year." 31 The European Union published a report just before the 2008 G8 summit titled "The Fight against Counterfeiting and Piracy in the Bilateral Trade Agreements of the EU."
III. INTERNATIONAL TREATIES AND OTHER ACTIONS
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The EU report cited the goal of creating a higher level of enforcement that countries could join on a voluntary basis. However, even the EU report expressed some concern that ACTA could criminalize non-commercial copyright infringement.
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Further insight into the mindset of the U.S. government regarding intellectual property right (IPR) issues can be gained from examining the Special 301 Reports of USTR, an annual review of IPR protection and enforcement in seventy-eight countries.
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The 2008 Report specifically referred to ACTA as a "leadership effort among countries that will raise the international standard for IPR enforcement to address today's challenges of counterfeiting and piracy." 35 The 2008 Special 301 Report also discussed the membership increase in the WIPO treaties. Once the EU Countries join, WIPO will then, according to the Report, represent "a majority world community view" such that other treaties and agreements, including TRIPS, should be "supplemented to eliminate any remaining gaps in copyright protection on the Internet."
36 Furthermore, the United States incorporates the WIPO treaties' standards in its bilateral and regional trade agreements, and seeks "accession to those treaties as a substantive obligation under these agreements." 37 Even though the USTR had acknowledged, since 2007, that it was involved in plurilateral trade negotiations with other countries over the provisions of ACTA, it declined to release the text of ACTA to the public because of the need for secrecy in trade negotiations. But finally, after two years of public demand for information on ACTA, various leaks of 31 Press Release, G8 Declaration on the World Economy, Hokkaido Toyako Summit, July 9, 2008, available at http://ipjustice.org/wp/2008/07/09/g8-declaration-on-the-world-economy/. 32 39 While the countries that participated in the negotiations unanimously agreed to release the draft text to the public, the April draft showed that much of the language in the agreement was still under debate. However, a little over five months later, the ACTA parties released the final Consolidated Text of the ACTA on October 2, 2010.
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While there are a number of controversial issues regarding the ACTA, the remainder of the paper will examine three issues addressed in the ACTA and compare the force and effect of those provisions to existing treaties and U.S. law.
A. Criminal Infringement
One topic of concern within ACTA is the international definition of piracy that would be subject to criminal penalty. There was initial concern that ACTA would circumvent the TRIPS standard for criminal copyright infringement, which is based on willful infringement on a commercial scale. 42 In fact, a Discussion Paper on ACTA notably omitted the "willful" requirement with regard to commercial scale infringement. 21, 2010) , http://www.ustr.gov/aboutus/press-office/press-releases/2010/april/office-us-trade-representative-releases-draft-text-a. 40 There is some speculation that the U.S. Chamber of Commerce pushed for conclusion of negotiations before the end of the year, or that President Obama wanted the final draft released before mid-term elections in November. See Kaitlin Mara, Civil Society Fights for Participation as ACTA Counter to WIPO Rises, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY WATCH, Sept. 24, 2010, http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/2010/09/24/civil-society-fights-for-participation-asacta-counterpoint-to-wipo-rises/. 41 A leaked draft of the ACTA dated January, 2010 did reference the name of the countries proposing particular provisions. Reference will be made of both the leaked version and the public version for the remainder of the paper to note the country likely responsible for proposing a particular provision only. 42 The April draft of ACTA, however, did require criminal penalties to be applied "at least in cases of willful trademark counterfeiting or copyright or related rights piracy on a commercial scale." 44 Willful piracy on a commercial scale is then defined to include: A) significant willful copyright or related rights infringement that have no direct or indirect motivation of financial gain; and B) willful copyright or related rights infringements for purposes of commercial advantage or financial gain. 45 Financial gain was defined as the "receipt or expectation of anything of value."
46 This appeared to push other ACTA parties toward the U.S. standard of criminal copyright infringement. It has been argued that these provisions allow one to be held liable for international criminal sanctions for large-scale copyright infringement even though the alleged infringer does so for "private" purposes. 47 This requirement of criminal penalties for copyright infringement would go further than TRIPS, which only requires criminal penalties for "willful trademark counterfeiting or copyright piracy on a commercial scale." 48 We can assume that this provision addressed some of the legal issues encountered by the RIAA, MPAA, and other copyright owners in combating the peer-to-peer file sharing networks. In fact, it was called the Pirate-Baykiller proposal by some because of its potential to shut down peer-to-peer and torrent sites such as Pirate Bay that do not generate revenue nor have servers within the United States. While these trade groups have had some success against individual companies with civil and sometimes criminal sanctions, this provision in the April ACTA draft would give them additional firepower for their arsenal.
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The April draft of ACTA also contained a proposal which would require criminal sanctions for "inciting, aiding and abetting" willful trademark, copyright, or related rights piracy. 50 This provision was a European Union proposal according to the January leaked draft 51 and has no basis in U.S. law. The European Union text treats "aiding or abetting and inciting the actual infringement" as intentional infringement subject to criminal penalties. 53 After the European Parliament adopted the Directive, the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) issued its opinion of the Directive, noting "incitement to commit a crime can only be established if the inciter supplies the tools for the specific purpose of committing the crime." 54 The EESC was also concerned that merely offering access to the Internet or providing widely used materials could not constitute criminal incitement. 55 Since there was no definition of "incite" in the April draft of ACTA or in the EU Directive and no precedent in the U.S. legal system, EU analysis would be relevant to how such a provision would be applied or interpreted. If this standard were adopted for criminal copyright infringement, it could extend secondary copyright infringement for software developers, device manufacturers, or ISPs.
The final October text of ACTA seems to have resolved these issues. It now provides that each country provide criminal penalties in "cases of willful trademark counterfeiting or copyright or related rights piracy on a commercial scale. 57 The same section also requires parties to include criminal liability for aiding and abetting, but there is no longer any reference to incitement in the agreement. 58 This certainly is a disappointing outcome for copyright owners, particularly the music and movie companies, in their efforts to shut down the peer-to-peer and torrent sites in foreign countries which offer file sharing software to users.
B. ISP Responsibility
Another hotly debated provision under the Criminal Liability section of ACTA is the provision that requires each party to establish liability for "legal persons," which would include ISPs. 59 Several proposals were made in the earlier drafts of ACTA with regard to third party liability. The April draft of ACTA required remedies, limitations, exceptions, and defenses for third party legal liability. 60 Most notable was the footnote definition of third party liability, which stated "liability for any person who authorizes for a direct financial benefit, induces through or by conduct directed to promoting infringement, or knowingly and materially aids any act of copyright or related rights infringement by another." 61 If one looks more closely at the language proposed in the April draft, particularly footnote 47, several issues bear further reflection and discussion. Footnote 47 purports to extend liability on three different bases. First, third party liability applies to any person who "authorizes for a direct financial benefit…any act of copyright or related rights infringement."
62 This essentially adopts a vicarious liability theory of copyright infringement, which imposes liability when the defendant "profits directly from the infringement and has a right and ability to supervise the direct infringer." 63 Second, the April draft states in footnote 47 that third party liability applies for any person who "induces through or by conduct directed to promoting infringement…aids any act of copyright or related rights economic or commercial advantage. 57 TRIPS, supra note 42, at Art. 61. 58 OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., ANTI-COUNTERFEITING TRADE AGREEMENT, Oct. Text, supra note 1, at Art. 2.14(4). 59 Id. at Art. 2.14(5). 60 OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., ANTI-COUNTERFEITING TRADE AGREEMENT, Apr. Draft, supra note 44, at Art. 2.18 (3). 61 Id. at note 47. 62 Id. 
infringement."
64 This seems to adopt the theory of inducement of copyright infringement adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court in MGM v. Grokster. 65 In this well known case, the Supreme Court held that "one who distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third parties."
66 Ironically, the majority opinion goes on to state that inducement theory "premises liability on purposeful, culpable expression and conduct, and thus does nothing to compromise legitimate commerce or discourage innovation having a lawful promise." 67 Third, footnote 47 states that third party liability applies to one who "knowingly and materially aids any act of copyright or related rights infringement."
68 This option adopts a theory of contributory infringement, which applies when defendants have knowledge of copyright infringement by third parties.
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The footnote goes on to reference "consideration of exceptions or limitation to exclusive rights…including fair use, fair dealing, or their equivalents." 70 Other paragraphs in Option one and Option two of this section are carefully crafted to include exceptions for third party liability in cases where the provider does not have actual knowledge of the infringement 71 , or where the provider has taken expeditious action to remove or disable access to the infringing activity. 72 Noticeably absent from this section is any language based on the "staple item of commerce" doctrine, known generally as the Sony safe-harbor doctrine. 73 The Sony safe-harbor doctrine is a defense to contributory copyright infringement when the 64 OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., ANTI-COUNTERFEITING TRADE AGREEMENT, Apr. Draft, supra note 44. 65 Grokster, 545 U.S. at 936-37. 66 Id. 67 Id. at 937. 68 OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., ANTI-COUNTERFEITING TRADE AGREEMENT, Apr. Draft, supra note 44, at footnote 47. 69 Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, 487 F.3d 701, 729 (9th Cir. 2007). The Supreme Court left the question of contributory infringement largely untouched in Grokster ("We do not revisit Sony further, as MGM requests, to add a more quantified description of the point of balance between protection and commerce when liability rests solely on distribution with knowledge that unlawful use will occur." Grokster at 934.) Thus, the Ninth Circuit in Perfect 10 found that the Supreme Court in Grokster defined two categories of contributory liability: one based on encouraging or inducing infringement through specific acts and the second on distributing a product that is not capable of substantial noninfringing uses. Perfect 10, 487 F.3d at 727. 70 OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., ANTI-COUNTERFEITING TRADE AGREEMENT, Apr. Draft, supra note 44, at footnote 47. 71 Id. at Art. 2.18 (3)(Option 1). 72 Id. at (Option 2). 73 Henning, supra note 12, at 185. defendant can show that the product at issue is capable of "substantial noninfringing uses" or "commercially significant noninfringing uses." 74 Although this part of the April draft certainly incorporates other U.S. theories of secondary copyright infringement, it specifically declines to incorporate the Sony safe-harbor provision. However, it does appear that this draft is designed to take the full power of the secondary copyright infringement theory adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court, and other lower courts, and extend that into the legal domain of many of our trading partners. 75 Thus, copyright owners were perhaps hoping to accomplish in one fell swoop what Napster, Grokster, the Berne Convention, WIPO, and TRIPS could notseamless imposition of liability for secondary copyright infringement on an international scale.
In a profound reversal of direction, however, the final text of ACTA completely eliminated all references to third party liability. Article 2.18 instead merely requires that each party provide enforcement procedures to permit effective action against infringement with an effective deterrent to further infringement. 76 This must be perceived as a defeat for copyright owners who were hoping for a legal imposition of U.S.-like third party liability.
Another important issue covered in ACTA addresses the obligation of ISPs to disclose customer information. For several years, trade groups, like the RIAA and MPAA, would file lawsuits against users, requiring ISPs to disclose the identities of customers engaging in file sharing. 77 As stated earlier, the RIAA abandoned this approach in 2008 and began pursuing agreements with ISPs that allowed the ISP to forward an email to the customer requesting that they stop uploading illegal content. 78 It is unknown whether the practice has worked to the satisfaction of the RIAA.
With regard to ISP responsibility, the April draft of ACTA provided two options. Option one required an ISP or Online Service Provider (OSP) to "expeditiously" remove or disable access to material upon receipt of legally sufficient notice of infringement or order from a competent authority. 79 This 74 Id. 75 We must assume that this provision also addresses much of the frustration the MPAA/RIAA encountered when they attempted to sue and shut down many of the torrent websites which were commonly used internationally for copyright infringing activity. Historically, the MPAA and RIAA have had mixed success in shutting down these sites, largely based on the varying degrees of copyright infringement protections in various countries. Id. 79 According to the leaked ACTA draft, the U.S. proposed the language "legally sufficient notice of alleged infringement," while Mexico proposed the language "order from a competent seems to mirror the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) "notice and take-down" provisions. 80 The DMCA provides that an ISP will not be held liable for copyright infringement if the ISP "acts expeditiously to remove, or disable access to" infringing material upon written communication signed by the rights holder which: (1) identifies the copyrighted work claimed to have been infringed; (2) identifies the material claimed to be infringing with location information; (3) gives contact information for the rights holder and affirmation of the correctness of the complaint. 81 In addition, Article 2.18 (Option two)(3ter) in the April draft of ACTA goes further by allowing a rights holder to expeditiously obtain the identity of a subscriber from an ISP/OSP when given effective notification "of materials that they claim with valid reasons to be infringing their copyright or related rights." 82 This would have preserved the right of U.S. content owners to obtain the identity of a subscriber from an ISP. The issue was how those identities would be obtained. Under the DMCA, a copyright owner can obtain the identity of a subscriber from an ISP by filing a request for a subpoena with a United States district court. 83 For the court to grant the subpoena, the rights holder must show the same elements it does for the notice and take-down request in §512(c)(3)(A). 84 Only upon receipt of the subpoena must the ISP disclose the identity of alleged infringer. 85 However, the ACTA provision in the April draft based release of the identity of an alleged infringer simply on "effective notification" to the ISP. 86 If this standard were adopted, it would apply the notice and take-down remedy of the DMCA based on much less than the currently required court subpoena. A rights holder would be able to request removal of copyrighted material and the identity of the alleged infringer by arguably submitting one request to the ISP. If an ISP were required to release personal subscriber information solely based on effective notice by a content owner, the due process rights of U.S. citizens would be compromised.
ACTA also proposed an alternative, Article 2.18 Option two (3 quater), which encouraged "mutually supportive relationships between online service providers and right holders to deal effectively with…infringement which strict TPM provisions in the DMCA, but failed to adopt any of the exceptions to the anti-circumvention provisions. 101 The final text of ACTA does allow for appropriate limitations or exceptions and is not intended to prejudice copyright defenses under a Party's law. 102 This would allow the DMCA exceptions for U.S. companies; however, it may create problems for U.S. companies if other ACTA parties have not adopted the same exceptions allowed under the DMCA. Thus, at least one group has suggested that ACTA's apparent obligation to adopt the DMCA's TPM provisions will allow the United States to achieve what it has only been able to do through bilateral free trade agreements. Section 301 of the 1984 Trade & Tariff Act gives the President of the United States the authority to deal with states that fail to provide adequate and effective protection for U.S. intellectual property rights. 104 If a foreign country fails to provide protection for U.S. intellectual property, the President can authorize withdrawal of trade benefits or impose duties on goods.
105 This is likely the basis under which the USTR has proceeded with such a sweeping plurilateral trade agreement as ACTA. Professors Goldsmith and Lessig argue that ACTA should be submitted for Senate approval as a treaty, or to Congress as a "congressional-executive" agreement.
An alternative view, and perhaps the one adopted by the USTR, is that the Treaty Power 108 can be used to give Congress a legislative source of authority independent of its Article I powers. 109 Professor Dinwoodie has argued, "the Treaty Clause may offer lawmaking authority in the international arena, with local effects, in ways that do not exist under the Copyright Clause with respect to purely local regulations." 110 This could be a basis for giving ACTA the true force and effect of law -eventually.
111
V. CONCLUSION
One must assume that the USTR has acted in the interests of the U.S. copyright holders, making concerted attempts to move other countries toward U.S. standards of copyright infringement and enforcement. There are obvious reasons why the United States government would be interested in enforcing U.S. copyright laws. It certainly serves the interests of many U.S. companies that lose billions of dollars a year from piracy of software, copyrighted, and patented goods. 112 No one could question that the United States has a legitimate interest in this regard.
The strategy and best interests of the content owners can be seen in the proposed provisions of the earlier versions of ACTA. Some of these provisions included the inducement theory of secondary liability, as well as the failure to include fair use, safe harbor, and other exceptions to the criminal and civil liability sections. Still other provisions placed third party liability on ISPs to release customer identity information, remove information, and even terminate Internet access upon mere notice of infringement.
With the combined efforts of the federal government in its trade negotiations, G8 support, civil lawsuits against torrent trackers, and criminal and civil lawsuits against individual users, it may appear that the content owners are slowly winning the fight to stop internet piracy. ACTA was
